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Abstract
Trades based on bilateral (indivisible) contracts can be represented by a network.
Vertices correspond to agents while arcs represent the non-price elements of a bilateral
contract. Given prices for each arc, agents choose the incident arcs that maximize
their utility. We enlarge the model to allow for polymatroidal constraints on the set
of contracts that may be traded which can be interpreted as modeling limited one-
for-one substitution. We show that for two-sided markets there exists a competitive
equilibrium however for multi-sided markets this may not be possible.
1 Introduction
Trades based on bilateral (indivisible) contracts are represented by a network. The vertices
correspond to agents while the arcs represent the non-price elements of a bilateral contract.
The arc’s orientation identifies which agent is the “buyer” and which the “seller”. The
model is rich enough to allow an agent to be a buyer in some trades and a seller in others.
It subsumes the classic assignment model (Shapley and Shubik 1971). Given prices for each
arc/trade, an agent chooses the subset of incident arcs that maximize her utility. A central
question is whether a competitive equilibrium in this economy exists.
In general it does not. Assuming quasi-linearity and a full substitutability condition
on agents’ preferences, (John William Hatfield et al. 2013) have shown that a competitive
equilibrium exists. Full substitutability is a generalization of the gross-substitutes prop-
erty introduced by Kelso-Crawford and is equivalent to valuations over contracts being M �
concave (Fujishige and Yang 2003, Murota and Tamura 2003). Competitive equilibria of
trading networks are also stable outcomes in that they cannot be blocked by any coalition of
agents and trades. A blocking set is a set of contracts and corresponding prices such that all
agents party to these contracts (strictly) prefer them (while possibly declining some of their
equilibrium contracts)(John W Hatfield et al. 2013). Conversely, in any stable outcome it is
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possible to set prices for contracts not involved in this outcome, to support the outcome as
a competitive equilibrium.
Candogan, Epitropou, and Vohra 2016, show that these results are a consequence of the
optimality conditions of a generalized submodular flow problem in a suitable network. The
optimal solutions to this flow problem (and its dual) yield a competitive equilibrium outcome
and supporting prices.
Contracts in the trading networks model are exogenously given and it is assumed that
an agent can participate in any subset of contracts to which she is a party to. In other
words, a vertex is free to choose any subset of its incident arcs. This is unsatisfying if the
contracts under consideration involve the exchange of resources in limited supply. Certain
combinations of contracts could be infeasible. This can be modeled by defining an agents
value for infeasible subsets of contracts to be −∞, which may result in a violation of M �
concavity.
In this paper we enlarge the trading networks model to allow for explicit constraints on the
set of contracts that may be traded. It is obvious that for arbitrary constraints, it is unlikely
that a competitive equilibrium will exist.1 Therefore, we restrict attention to constraints that
can be represented by polymatroids. Polymatroids are polyhedrons associated with integer
valued submodular functions. They play an important role in combinatorial optimization
but also make an appearance in some market design settings. In the context of trading
networks they can be interpreted as modeling limited one-for-one substitution. Informally,
the marginal rate of technical substitution between two products evaluated at any bundle is
either zero or one. This interpretation appears in (Milgrom 2009).
The first contribution of this paper is establishing the existence of a competitive equilib-
rium for two sided markets, ones in which agents are either sellers or buyers but not both.2
Closest comparable results we are aware of are (Kojima, Sun, and Yu 2018) and (Gul, Pe-
sendorfer, and Zhang 2019). Both consider one-sided markets, the first without transfers
and the second with. Theorem 3 of the second paper is a special case of our result. Our
second result shows that existence of a competitive equilibrium fails in multi-sided settings.
The next section introduces the notation used in this paper. The subsequent section
summarizes result needed from the literature on discrete convexity. The remaining sections
describe our main results.
2 Notation
A trading network is represented by a directed multigraph G = (N,E) where N is the set
of vertices and E the set of arcs. Each vertex i ∈ N corresponds to an agent and each arc
e ∈ E corresponds to the non-price elements of a trade that can take place between the
incident pair of vertices. For each e ∈ E, the source vertex e+ corresponds to the seller and
the sink vertex e− corresponds to the buyer in the trade. Let δ+(i) and δ−(i) be the outgoing
and incoming arcs incident to vertex i ∈ N , and δ(i) = δ+(i) ∪ δ−(i). So as to avoid having
to distinguishing between a trade involving one unit of a good and two units of the same
1This was already observed in (John W Hatfield et al. 2013).
2This is equivalent to a multi-sided setting where the utility of the corresponding agents is separable over
the contracts it buys and sells though.
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good, we will allow for integral ‘intensities’ of trade. Formally, an outcome is any vector
x ∈ ZE+ where xe denotes the number of copies of trade e that were executed. We define a
price vector p ∈ RE, where pe is the price associated with the trade that corresponds to the
arc e. Denote by pX the price vector restricted to the arcs in X.
It is more convenient to represent the volume of trade associated with arc e between
agents i and j using two variables rather than one: yie and yje. If e ∈ δ+(i) then, yie ≥ 0
otherwise yie ≤ 0. We will call the y variables net-flows.
Every x ∈ ZE+ that is an outcome, corresponds to a new flow. For any arc e between
agents i and j we have |yie| = |yje| = xe and yie+yje = 0. A net-flow y = (y1, . . . , y|N |) is called
feasible if it corresponds to an outcome, i.e., for every arc e we have yie + yje = 0 whenever
e ∈ δ+(i) ∩ δ−(j). If yi is the incidence vector of trades in which i is a part of, the value
function of agent i will be written as wi : yi → R ∪ {−∞}.3 Agent i’s surplus or utility for
the vector of trades yi will be
ui(yi, p) = wi(yi) +
�
e∈δ+(i)
yiepe +
�
e∈δ−(i)
yiepe.
Given a price vector p ∈ Rδ(i), agent i ∈ N ’s demand correspondence is
Di(p) = argmax{ui(yi, p) : yi ∈ Zδ+(i)+ × Z
δ−(i)
− }.
Definition 2.1 A feasible net-flow y = (y1, . . . , y|N |) along with a price vector p ∈ RE is a
competitive equilibrium (y, p) if, for all i ∈ N , yi ∈ Di(p).
Definition 2.2 An efficient outcome is one that solves the following problem:
max
�
i∈N
wi(yi)
s.t. yie + yje = 0 ∀ i = e+, j = e− ∀e ∈ E
yie ∈ Z+ ∀e ∈ δ+(i) ∀i
yie ∈ Z− ∀e ∈ δ−(i) ∀i
Under quasi-linearity, every competitive equilibrium outcome y is efficient and conversely.
Further, if y is efficient, there exists a price vector p such that the pair (y, p) is a competitive
equilibrium.
2.1 Background on Discrete Convexity
In this section we review definitions and properties of M -convex sets/functions. For a more
extensive discussion see (Murota 2003b). For all y ∈ Zn we define supp+(y) = {i|yi > 0}
and supp−(y) = {i|yi < 0}. The notion of M − convexity is based on the exchanges between
the sets supp+ and supp−. Let’s start by defining the ”M-convex” set.
3Having −∞ in the range of the value function allows for incorporating trading constraints as described
in John W Hatfield et al. 2013, e.g., if a trader cannot sell goods without procuring its inputs first, this can
be incorporated by specifying −∞ for bundles of trades where this happens.
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Definition 2.3 A set B ⊆ ZE is called M-convex if for all x, y ∈ B and for all u ∈
supp+(x− y) there exists a v ∈ supp−(x− y) such that x−χu+χv and y+χu−χv are both
in the set B.
In definition 2.3, χu refers to the basis vector where the uth element is one and all others are
zero. M-convex functions are defined similarly in (2.4).
Definition 2.4 A function f : ZE → R for an M-convex domain B is called M-convex if
for all x, y ∈ B , ∀u ∈ supp+(x− y) there exists a v ∈ supp−(x− y) such that
f(x) + f(y) ≥ f(x− χu + χv) + f(y + χu − χv).
Definition 2.5 A function f, is called M-concave if −f is M-convex.
M-convexity has strong ties with submodularity. A real valued submodular function f defined
on E is one that satisfies f(S) + f(T ) ≥ f(S ∪ T ) + f(S ∩ T ) for all S, T ⊆ E.
Theorem 2.1 For any M-convex set B, the function f(S) = max{
�
j∈S xj|x ∈ B} for
every S ⊆ E is a submodular function.
Theorem 2.1 gives a connection between M-convex sets and integral submodular set
functions. The converse is also true.
Corollary 2.1 If f is an integer valued submodular function on E, then there exists an
M-convex set B ⊆ ZE such that f(S) = max{
�
j∈S xj|x ∈ B}.
If f is a submodular function on E, then, the polymatroid associated with f is the
polyhedron Pf = {x ∈ RE :
�
e∈S xe ≤ f(S) ∀S ⊆ E}. It is called an integral polymatroid
if f is integer valued. In fact, the M-convex set B in Corollary 2.1 is precisely Pf .
The definition of M-convexity relies on the exchange between two different elements and
it can be weakened to cover single element exchanges. We start with the set definition first.
Definition 2.6 A set B ⊆ ZE is called M �-convex if for all x, y ∈ B and for all u ∈
supp+(x− y) we have one of the following:
x− χu and y + χu are both in B.
There exists a v ∈ supp−(x− y) such that x− χu + χv and y+ χu− χv are both in the
set B.
M � − convex functions are defined as follows.
Definition 2.7 A function f : ZE → R is called M �-convex if for all x, y ∈ B, ∀u ∈
supp+(x− y) we have one of the following.
f(x) + f(y) ≥ f(x− χu) + f(y + χu).
There exists a v ∈ supp−(x−y) such that f(x)+f(y) ≥ f(x−χu+χv)+f(y+χu−χv).
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A function f : ZE → R is calledM �-concave if −f isM �-convex. The domain of a function
f : ZE → R is defined to be domf = {x ∈ Zn|f(x) < ∞}. A consequence of a function
being M �-convex is the following:
Lemma 2.1 The domain of an M �-convex function is an M �-convex set.
Definition 2.8 The convex-extension of a function is as follows (the intersection of the
supporting hyperplanes of the epigraph):
fˆ(x) = min{
�
z
λzf(z)|
�
z
λzz = x, 0 ≤ λz ≤ 1,
�
z
λz = 1}
We can define concave-extension similarly.
Definition 2.9 fˆ(x) is the concave-extension of f(x) if −fˆ(x) is the convex-extension
of −f(x).
2.2 Optimality
Suppose each agent’s valuation function, wi is M �-concave and let f(y) =
�
iwi(yi). Note,
f(y) is alsoM � concave because the argument of each wi are disjoint. The problem of finding
an efficient outcome in the trading network setting can be formulated as:
maximize : f(y) s.t. y ∈ B.
Here B represents the set of feasible trades:
yie + yje = 0 ∀ i = e+, j = e− ∀e ∈ E
yie ∈ Z+ ∀e ∈ δ+(i) ∀i
yie ∈ Z− ∀e ∈ δ−(i) ∀i
A convex relaxation of this problem is:
maximize : fˆ(y) s.t. y ∈ B∗ (1)
where fˆ(y) is the concave extension (definition 2.8) of the objective function f(y) and B∗ is
the set of solutions to
yie + yje = 0 ∀ i = e+, j = e− ∀e ∈ E
yie ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ δ+(i) ∀i
yie ≤ 0 ∀e ∈ δ−(i) ∀i
It is known that problem (1) has an integral solution (Murota 2003a), the Lagrange multi-
pliers associated with the inequality representation of B will be supporting prices and this
establishes the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
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The set B∗ in problem (1) had a particular structure one might wonder if integrality of
the convex relaxation might hold more generally. Here we show that it does if the set of
net-flows is constrained to lie in an integral polymatroid, denoted P . Consider:
maximize fˆ(y) s.t. y ∈ P (2)
We show problem 2 has an integer optimal. This result, is, as far as we know new, however
special cases of it do appear, for example (Gul, Pesendorfer, and Zhang 2019).
Let us recall the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2 (Thm 4.22 Murota 2003a) For M-convex sets B1 and B2 the convex closure
of their intersection is equal to the intersection of their convex closures, that is
B¯1 ∩ B¯2 = (B1 ∪B2).
Definition 2.10
Bf (x) = {z ∈ N(x)�∃λ,
�
z
λz = 1,
�
z
λzz = x,
�
z
λzf(z) = fˆ(x)}
where N(x) is the unit hypercube containing x and fˆ(x) is the convex extension of function
f .
Bf (x) will have an important role in our analysis. The convex extension of function f(y) is
a piece-wise linear function and Bf (x) represent the maximal set that contains x such that
convex extension is linear. This can be viewed as the facets of the epigraph.
Lemma 2.2 For every M � concave function f and x in the convex hull of the domain of f ,
Bf (x) is an M-convex set.
Proof. Let x1, x2 ∈ Bf (x). Since f(x) is anM � concave function there exists u ∈ supp+(x1−
x2) and v ∈ supp−(x1 − x2) such that,
f(x1 − χu + χv) + f(x2 + χu − χv) ≥ f(x1) + f(x2).
Now take convex coefficients λ1, λ2 such that
�
z∈N(x)
λ1zz =
�
z∈N(x)
λ2zz = x
and
�
z∈N(x) λif(z) = fˆ(x) (by definition such a λi exists). Then for λ =
λ1+λ2
2 we have�
z λzz = x,
�
z∈N(x) f(z) = fˆ(x), λx1 > 0 and λx2 > 0. If we set λδ = min{λx1 , λx2} we
obtain the following inequality
fˆ(x) ≥ [
�
z∈N(x)−{x1,x2}
λzf(z)]+λδ(f(x1−χu+χv)+f(x2+χu−χv))+(λx1−λδ)f(x1)+(λx2−λδ)f(x2)
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≥
�
z∈N(x)
f(z) = fˆ(x).
But then, by definition (x1 − χu + χv), (x2 + χu − χv) are both in Bf (x) hence Bf (x) is an
M-convex set.
Corollary 2.2 For all probability vectors λ such that
�
z∈Bf (x) λzz = x we have fˆ(x) =�
z λzf(z).
Proof follows trivially from the definition of Bf (x).
Theorem 2.3 If f is M#-concave function and P is an integral polymatroid, then, there
exists an integer optimizer for problem 2.
Proof. Let x be an optimizer for problem 2. If N(x) ⊆ B then we are done since at least one
extreme point of N(x) will also be an optimizer. Else let Fx be the face of B that contains x.
Fx is an M-convex set (as we have seen earlier M-convex sets are essentially polymatroids).
From lemma 2.2 we know that Bf (x) is an M-convex set and from theorem 2.2 we have
x ∈ Fx ∩Bf (x) = (Fx ∪Bf (x)).
But then there exists convex coefficients λ such that
�
z∈(Fx∪Bf (x))
λzz = x.
From corollary 2.2 we have �
z∈(Fx∪Bf (x))
λzf(z) = fˆ(x).
But then there exists a y∗ ∈ (Fx∪Bf (x)) such that f(y∗) ≤ fˆ(x) and since x is an optimizer,
y∗ has to be an optimizer too. Since y∗ is integral this concludes the proof.
3 Separable Utility
Consider the case of one buyer (agent 1) and one seller (agent 2). Thus, the vertex cor-
responding to agent 1 has no outgoing arcs only incoming ones. The vertex corresponding
to agent 2 has no incoming arcs only outgoing arcs. Hence, y1 = −y2 = x where x is an
outcome. Assume that x is constrained to a polymatroid P . w1(y1) is M#-concave but
w2(y2) is linear. Denote by the wˆi the convex extension of wi. Our objective is to maximize
wˆ1(y1) + wˆ2(y2) = wˆ1(x) + wˆ2(−x)
over x ∈ P where wˆi is the concave extension of wi.
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Lemma 3.1 The maximizer(s) of
wˆ1(y1) + wˆ2(y2) = wˆ1(x) + wˆ2(−x)
over x ∈ P are integral.
Proof. Let x be a maximizer of the objective. Observe that w1 is linear over the set Bw1(x).
Then w1(x) +w2(−x) is linear over the set Bw1 ∩ P (both w1 and w2 are linear on this set).
But then, this is a linear program and there exists an extreme point of Bw1 ∩P that achieves
the optimum, since the intersection of two integral M-convex sets is an integral polyhedra
all of whose extreme points are integral. The proof follows.
We generalize Lemma 3.1 to trade networks where each agents utility wi(yi) is separable
as follows.
wi(yi) = w+i (yi+) + w−i (yi−)
where w+i is M �-concave, w−i is linear and yi+, yi− represent the net-flows that correspond
to the outgoing/incoming edges respectively. The problem of finding an efficient allocation,
denoted problemEA, can be written as follows.
max
�
i
(w+i (yi+) + w−i (yi−)) (3)
s.t. x ∈ P (4)
yie = xe = −yje, ∀e ∈ δ+(i) ∩ δ−(j) (5)
where P is an integral polymatroid.
Theorem 3.1 Problem EA has an integral optimum.
Proof. For i �= j we have δ+(i) ∩ δ+(j) = ∅ and supp(yi−) ∩ supp(yj−) = ∅. Then,�
i(w
+
i (y(δ+(i)))(represented by w+(x)) is an M#-concave function while
�
iw
−
i (y(δ−(i)))(represented
by w−(−x)) is linear. Substituting w+ and w− into the objective function allows us to invoke
Lemma (3.1) to conclude the proof.
The separability requirement clearly holds in two sided markets where an agent is either a
buyer or a seller but not both. Hence, buyers can have M �-utilities over the edges they ‘con-
sume’ while sellers have linear costs over the edges they ‘sell’. The separability requirement
can be relaxed. For all i let the utility function be wi(yi) = wi(yi+, yi−) such that when yi+ is
kept constant the function is linear over yi− and when yi− is kept constant it is M �-concave
over yi+. In other words, when the incoming/outgoing links are kept constant, the function
is M �-concave/linear on the outgoing/incoming edges.
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4 Impossibility
In this section we show that if we relax separability and allow the market to be multi-sided,
then, a competitive equilibrium need not exist.
Let the outcome vector x ∈ ZE is constrained to lie in a polymatroid. This means that
trade between two distinct pairs of agents can be linked to each other. For example, the
volume of trade that a pair a, b can conduct could be limited by the volume of trade that
another pair, c, d, conduct. This can happen if the execution of trades require the use of
shared infrastructure. For instance, a could be selling electricity to b and similarly c is selling
electricity to d. If they use a common grid electricity to distribute power, then, the trades
of one pair constrain the trades that the other pair can engage in.
We append to problem (1) the requirement that the outcome vector, x ∈ ZE, lie in a
polymatroid. arbitrary polymatroidal constraints on the links ignoring their orientation.
We examine whether this augmented problem has an integral solution. The example below
shows this is not the case and demonstrates that a competitive equilibrium in this setting
does not exist.
Example 1 Consider the network given in figure 1 with two agents, N1, N2. Each agent
has one incoming and one outgoing link denoted e and g. The value functions of each agent
are displayed below. They are M �-concave.
w1(y1e , y1g) = (6)
− 0.5 y1e = 0, y1g = 0 (7)
− 0 y1e = 1, y1g = −1 (8)
− 1 y1e = 1, y1g = 0 (9)
− 1 y1e = 0, y1g = −1 (10)
−∞ elsewhere. (11)
w2(y2e , y2g) = (12)
− 0.5 y2e = 0, y4 = 0 (13)
− 0 y2g = 1, y2e = −1 (14)
− 1 y2g = 1, y2e = 0 (15)
− 1 y2g = 0, y2e = −1 (16)
−∞ elsewhere. (17)
Since the arguments of the function w1 and w2 are disjoint, the functionf(y) = w1(y1e , y1g) +
w2(y2e , y2g) is also M �-Concave. Consider the polymatroid on x ∈ ZE defined below:
P = {x�xe ≤ 1, xg ≤ 1, xe + xg ≤ 1}.
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Figure 1: Simple Counterexample
The net-flows corresponding to x are y1e = −y2e = xe and −y1g = y2g = xg. Given an outcome
x, denote by y(x) the corresponding net-flows. Then, we have f(y(0, 0)) = −1, f(y(1, 1)) =
0, f(y(1, 0)) = f(y(0, 1)) = −2. However,
max
x∈P
fˆ(y(x)) ≥ 1/2f(y(0, 0)) + 1/2f(y(1, 1)) = −0.5
and this is larger than each integral feasible flow which will lead to a larger objective value.
This shows that we cannot have an integral efficient outcome.
5 Conclusion
In trading networks even relatively simple constraints on the set of feasible trades are an
obstacle to the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Under polymatroidal constraints
separability of the utility function is crucial for the existence of competitive equilibrium.
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